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Executive Secretary of ECLAC 
Enrique V. Iglesias 
The stalements made by the Executive Secretary at the 
F.CLAC sessions are among the fullest expressions of the 
institution's thought. The present article reproduces 
the address delivered at the Third Plenary Meeting of 
the Twentieth Session (April 1984), the aim being to 
present an overview of the present economic situation 
of Latin America. 
The purpose of the first and second sections is to 
identify the origins and the special characteristics of 
the crisis and the decisive part played in it by the 
external debt, the markedly recessive adjustment poli-
cies that have been applied and the costs and tensions 
which they have engendered. The third section refers 
to the immediate prospects, which do not seem over-
promising, while the fourth discusses the medium-
term outlook and its main external and internal deter-
minants. 
The fifth and last section sketches certain policy 
options that could be pursued, with all due regard to 
the considerable inter-country differences existent. 
On the one hand, it underlines the priority objectives 
towards which these policies should be oriented: eco-
nomic efficiency and growth, equity in the distribution 
of the benefits of such growth, and autonomy in de-
velopment. On the other, it analyses some of the 
means and conditions which are particularly impor-
tant for the promotion of the development in ques-
tion. Thus, allusion is made to the need for combining 
the impulses given by internal and external demand 
—the latter backed up by export promotion policies, 
the strengthening of the regional market and the uti-
lization of international markets— and to the mo-
dernization of the State, which has a decisive role to 
enact in the difficult years ahead. The last paragraphs 
recall the importance of political elements, such as the 
social mobilization by which efforts in pursuit of de-
velopment and the construction of democratic and 
participative societies must be supported, and the ne-
cessity of reaching a social consensus whereby the cost 
of conflicts may be reduced. 
Introduction 
In this paper I should like to set forth some 
considerations on the recent evolution and fu-
ture prospects of the Latin American economy at 
this critical stage. These basically represent my 
own personal reflections, backed up by the ECLAC 
Secretariat's systematic monitoring of Latin 
American economic trends. 
The changes which have taken place in the 
world and the region in recent years, in both the 
political and the economic and social areas, have 
been astoundingly far-reaching and rapid. The 
transformations in the international system 
which had prevailed since the war, the structural 
modifications in the centres and the changing 
structure of centre-periphery relations have 
combined with the changes which have taken 
place in the economic and social structures of the 
majority of the countries of the region to make 
up a corresponding array of forces which in-
teract among themselves and develop at a rate 
which, on occasions, outstrips our ability to 
understand and process them within a coherent 
framework of ideas. 
Looking back on these changes from our 
present position, we can see that the search for 
formulas which would make it possible to update 
the development strategies applied by the coun-
tries of the region in the post-war era was fol-
lowed by the failure of some populist experi-
ments and also by the rise and fall of some 
attempts to restore past models of a neoliberal 
type. This experience tells us that we should 
approach the new realities in a spirit of greater 
humility, seeking to understand and handle 
them better than in the past, with an attitude that 
is at once imaginative yet pragmatic and free of 
prejudice. 
Thus, a kind of feeling of helplessness has 
been created, in view of the lack of coherent 
schemes, and this situation may be observed not 
only in the developing countries, but also in the 
industrial centres themselves, which have tradi-
tionally produced the great intellectual syntheses 
that have inspired the guidelines for national 
development policies and the international eco-
nomic scenario. The neo-Keynesian view, which 
predominated in one way or another until the 
1970s, has entered into crisis, without however 
having been replaced by any other approach 
carrying equal influence. At the same time, the 
spirit of multilateralism which characterized the 
organization of international relations during 
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the era following the war has also entered into 
crisis, and a dangerous dichotomy has been cre-
ated between the trends towards an increasingly 
interdependent international economy and the 
absence of authentically global instruments to 
manage the changes and overcome the crisis. 
This confused and disquieting picture repre-
sents a major challenge to economic thinking and 
policies, both in the centres and in the periphery. 
Our response to this challenge is the task to which 
we shall have to devote ourselves in the coming 
years, by first making a calm appraisal of the 
experiences we have lived through and then 
drawing up a balance-sheet of the limitations and 
opportunities faced by our countries on account 
of the new realities which have arisen in both the 
domestic and the international spheres. 
At the beginning of the 1980s Latin America had 
to confront the severest economic crisis it has 
experienced since the fateful years of the Great 
Depression. This process was undeniably influ-
enced by domestic causes, but also by a complex 
set of factors arising out of the performance of 
the economies of the industrialized countries. 
One of the most outstanding features of the crisis 
is the fact that it has extended, to different de-
grees and in different forms, to practically all the 
countries of the region. Another striking feature 
is its depth and duration. The three-year period 
1981-1983 was characterized by a sharp drop in 
the product —in both global and per capita 
terms—, a marked reduction in rates of invest-
ment, the spectacular intensification of inflation-
ary pressures, a rise in unemployment, and a 
drop in real wages. These negative changes on 
the domestic front were accompanied by others 
no less negative in the external sector, the most 
tangible manifestations of which have been the 
payments crises, the rise in exchange rates, the 
loss of international reserves, and, above all, the 
insupportable increase in the external debt ser-
This task involves formidable difficulties. 
The first lies in the unprecedented nature of the 
problems to which we must find a response. To 
this is added the uncertainty prevailing as re-
gards the direction the world economy will take 
and the meaning of the structural changes which 
are occurring in the great industrial centres. In 
addition, there is the fact that the great diversity 
of situations existing in Latin America dooms to 
failure any attempt to find general formulas ap-
plicable to the entire region. The circumstances 
do not appear to be favourable for the creation of 
large economic models with claims to general 
valic ty, but rather for the elaboration of cohe-
rent and well-balanced syntheses, based on care-
ful consideration of the lessons of the past and 
the challenges raised by the new realities. 
vice commitments. In short, we are faced with the 
most serious economic contraction in the last fifty 
years, with heavy destruction or i under-utilization 
of the capital accumulated in recent decades and 
a six-year setback in the region's social progress, 
so that its standards of living were the same in 
1983 as they had been in 1977. 
Although the history of the crisis goes back to 
the first half of the 1970s —when the region 
coped with the first oil crisis relatively well, due to 
a set of factors in which external borrowing play-
ed a highly significant role— its worsening at the 
beginning of the 1980s brought about particular-
ly serious consequences, since it put an end to the 
growth cycle which the Latin American econo-
mies had experienced over the past three de-
cades. 
The crisis also marked the downfall of those 
economic policies which made too much use of 
external borrowing, as a result of the failure 
(although there were differences between the 
individual countries) to appreciate the proper 
role of international financing and the advan-
tages and risks of indebtedness. These policies 
I 
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were facilitated by the unprecedented permis-
siveness then prevailing in the great internation-
al financial centres, inspired by a confidence in 
past experience —which on this occasion proved 
to be displaced—, according to which interna-
tional inflation would tend to lessen the weight of 
indebtedness with the passage of the years. 
Owing to the generous flows of private capi-
tal made available at that time, the Latin Amer-
ican count r ies managed to maintain high 
volumes of imports which, in part, contributed to 
achieving satisfactory rates of economic growth. 
These rates exceeded those recorded in the in-
dustrialized countries, and enabled the countries 
of the region to cope relatively easily with the 
international recession of 1974-1975, which was 
due, inter alia, to the adjustment which the econo-
mies had to make to the new energy prices. This, 
however, was only a temporary situation. 
The situation remained manageable until 
the end of the 1970s. At the beginning of the 
present decade, however, the risks involved in 
applying economic policies based on the exces-
sive use of external borrowing in a recessive con-
text became obvious, when the recession in the 
industrialized countries grew more acute, inter-
national interest rates suddenly rose, and the 
terms of trade of the developing countries de-
teriorated. The increasing burden of servicing 
the debt and the decline in export income made 
the maintenance of an acceptable growth rate 
increasingly dependent upon the possibility of 
attracting new flows of external resources, at ex-
tremely high costs. Furthermore, this possibility 
was drastically reduced in 1982 and 1983, when 
there was a reversal of the extreme permissive-
ness shown by the international financial system 
during the preceding decade and a massive con-
traction in the inflow of new capital to the region, 
which greatly aggravated the recession caused by 
the economic cycle of the great industrial centres 
through the increase in interest rates and the 
decrease in the export income of the Latin Amer-
ican countries. Such, very briefly, was the evolu-
tion of the crisis currently being confronted by 
the region. 
In these circumstances, three types of ques-
tions may be raised with respect to this process: a) 
How was this situation reached, and what fea-
tures does it present in the case of Latin America? 
b) What short-term prospects are opened up to 
us by the adjustment processes and reactivation 
policies being applied in the centres? and c) What 
are the implications of this perverse combination 
of old structural problems with those which will 
remain as the aftermath of the crisis, as far as the 
development models which the Latin American 
countries could try out in the medium and long 
terms are concerned? In order to respond to the 
first type of question, we must go more deeply 
into recent events. 
1. Origins of the crisis: structural elements, 
national policies and the external cycle 
If we place our analysis in a correct historical 
perspective, we must acknowledge that the mag-
nitude and features of the crisis were substantial-
ly influenced by the long-standing structural 
problems so often analysed in ECLAC studies. 
However, this consideration should not serve to 
detract from the importance of domestic policies 
and the behaviour of the external cycle during 
the 1970s. Both of these elements encouraged 
excessive use of external borrowing; most of the 
loans, for reasons which will be dealt with below, 
were contracted with private sources, and in-
debtedness now amounts, at the regional level, to 
more than US$ 330 billion. This extremely high 
degree of indebtedness, which is the most impor-
tant immediate cause of the crisis being experi-
enced by the Latin American countries today, is 
in its turn the expression of a complex combina-
tion of both domestic and external factors. 
We have already mentioned the fact that this 
indebtedness was made possible by the extraor-
dinary climate of international financial permis-
siveness which prevailed at the beginning of the 
last decade: a situation due to factors which had 
existed from the end of the 1960s but which 
subsequently became stronger as a result of the 
great in ternat ional liquidity generated on 
account of the surpluses accumulated by the pe-
troleum-exporting countries. This prompted a 
vigorous resurgence of the international capital 
markets, especially through the new Eurocur-
rency market, and they eventually had an unpre-
cedented volume of liquid resources at their dis-
posal, the mobilization of which was carried out 
without any reference to the national monetary 
authorities and international financial bodies. In 
effect, the international private banking system 
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was given carte blanche for recycling these re-
sources, which it did with apparent efficiency 
during that period. However, because of the 
competition in lending their financial surpluses, 
the banks ignored many of the criteria which had 
guided these operations in the past, thus increas-
ing their risk to an extent which has become 
evident with the crisis. 
The economic policies followed by the Latin 
American countries during the period in ques-
tion stimulated that process, at different rates 
and in different ways. I have already noted that 
recourse to external credit was used to a con-
siderable extent in order to surmount the first 
depression of the mid-1970s and maintain the 
countries' growth rate. This credit facilitated the 
expansion of domestic spending, which was ap-
plied to different purposes, not all of which con-
tributed to the same extent to the achievement of 
that objective. In some cases —perhaps the 
fewest— domestic spending was directed to-
wards programmes of investment in production 
projects which, unfortunately, in many cases in-
volved very long lead times, were over-ambitious, 
or were based on excessively optimistic assump-
tions as to market behaviour, thus giving rise to a 
situation in which a considerable proportion of 
the investments remained partially idle. In other 
cases, the increased indebtedness was used to 
support indiscriminate policies of greater exter-
nal openness which implied a sharp expansion in 
imports, including a high proportion of all kinds 
of consumer goods. In some cases, the external 
loans served to encourage policies of exchange 
ove r -va lua t ion ins tead of au then t i c anti-
inflationary strategies. On other occasions, the 
implementation of macroeconomic policies lack-
ing in coherency led to loss of confidence and 
flight of capital, with the resulting depletion of 
reserves. Lastly, there were even cases where the 
said indebtedness stimulated a vigorous process 
of arms purchases. 
Consequently, to attribute the bulk of the 
responsibility for the current crisis in Latin 
America to external factors would be incorrect 
and would endanger the credibility of the Latin 
American position. The same would be true if 
the analysis were to stress unilaterally the finan-
cial and monetary aspects of the crisis —which 
are indeed its most serious and obvious symp-
toms— while neglecting the real aspects which 
are, in the final analysis, responsible for it. 
Among these aspects mention should be made of 
the recession and the economic policies of the 
developed countries, which affect the demand 
for products exported by Latin America; the 
protectionism prevailing in the developed coun-
tries, which thus limit the Latin American coun-
tries' access to their markets; the impact of the 
crisis on the production apparatus of the Latin 
American countries, resulting from the growing 
control of financial interests over the production 
sectors, the over-indebtedness of the private sec-
tor and the failure of businesses; the under-
utilization of existing production capacity, and 
unemployment; the negative effects of the exces-
sive strengthening of national financial systems 
in comparison with production sectors; the con-
traction in investment; the impact of the crisis on 
the income of large sectors of the population, 
which have had to bear an inordinately high 
proportion of the burden of the adjustment, and 
—in general— the application of domestic poli-
cies which over-stimulated consumption or in-
vestment, fostered currency over-valuation, gave 
rise to fiscal deficits, or set off processes of open-
ing-up to the exterior that were excessive or too 
rapid. 
In short, when the causes of the process are 
analysed, the conclusion reached is that they in-
clude both domestic and external factors and 
that behind their financial and monetary aspects 
lie real aspects which have had great influence on 
the development of the crisis. All of these factors 
have come to bear differently in each country, 
depending on its stage of development, the fea-
tures of its economy or the economic policies 
applied by it. 
2. The debt spiral and financial slowdown 
In order better to understand the behaviour and 
interconnection of these different factors, the 
recent indicators should be examined more 
closely. The debt situation of the Latin American 
countries first began to cause concern at the end 
of the 1970s, by which time the regional debt had 
already reached US$ 200 billion. This concern 
was partly allayed, however, by the evolution of 
the international cycle and the region's perfor-
mance in the export field. In the case of Mexico, 
for example, the growth rate of the domestic 
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product between 1970 and 1979 averaged 6.4% 
per year, while exports grew at an annual rate of 
11.9%. During the same period, the comparable 
figures for Brazil were 6.7% and 9.1%, respec-
tively, while in the case of Argentina a very mod-
est increase in the growth of the product (2.6%) 
was accompanied by a rate of export expansion 
of 10.7%. The performance of exports during 
the second half of this decade was especially note-
worthy; they not only recovered the rate of ex-
pansion which they had displayed before the cri-
sis of 1974-1975, but even surpassed it, since 
between 1976 and 1981 the region's exports in-
creased at an annual rate of approximately 9%. 
Briefly, what happened was that the behaviour of 
the international financial and commercial mar-
kets, and the performance of the region in terms 
of economic growth and —particularly— ex-
ports, calmed any doubts that might have been 
raised by the high level of its external indebted-
ness. 
The situation underwent a radical change at 
the beginning of the 1980s, however. Thus, the 
international economic situation-changed course 
spectacularly, due to the increase in interest rates 
and the persistent and pronounced drop in the 
terms of trade, with particularly acute conse-
quences for the Latin American countries with 
the heaviest debts. Interest rates, after having 
been negative or only slightly positive during the 
entire past decade, rose sharply in real terms (see 
table 1). This phenomenon was aggravated by 
the fact that, a good deal before this, the terms of 
trade had deteriorated drastically. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: REAL INTEREST RATES 
AND NET CAPITAL INFLOW 
[Percentages and billions oj dollars) 
Interest Capital 
rates inflow 
1973 2.94 8.1 
1974 0.11 11.6 
1975 -2.21 14.5 
1976 -0.22 18.3 
1977 -0.50 17.3 
1978 1.23 26.4 
1979 0.66 29.0 
1980 0.86 30.2 
1981 6.11 37.9 
1982 6.91 16.7 
1983 6.71 3.2 
Source: ECXAC 
The negative combination of the two factors 
aggravated the difficulties created by the very 
heavy external debt contracted by the region: as 
debt service commitments rose, the income 
obtained by the Latin American countries from 
their exports diminished. Thus, the countries 
were forced to contract new debts simply to meet 
the interest payments on the accumulated debt. 
For the region as a whole, these payments came 
to represent about 36% of their earnings from 
exports of goods and services in the period 1982-
1983. These figures highlight the increase in the 
part played by the external cycle in the worsening 
of the region's situation. 
In the period 1982-1983 a factor which had a 
singularly powerful influence in accelerating the 
crisis made its presence felt: namely, the serious 
financial contraction brought about by the pri-
vate banking system as a reaction to the crisis. 
The private banks, which supplied most of Latin 
America's external financing throughout the 
1970s, and whose loans were growing at a rate of 
over 20% per year at the end of that decade, 
reduced their credits drastically during these two 
years, causing a sudden drop in the inflow of 
capital into Latin America (see table 1). This drop 
would have been even greater had it not been for 
the intervention of the international financial 
bodies and especially, the International Mone-
tary Fund. 
Eci.Ac has placed great emphasis on the im-
pact of this financial contraction, which came on 
top of the economic recession caused by the in-
ternational cycle through the rise in interest rates 
and the slump in the terms of trade. ' In order to 
appreciate the magnitude of the problems which 
the contraction has created for the Latin Amer-
ican countries, one need merely consider that if 
the terms of trade in 1983 had reached only their 
1980 level and the real interest rates had been 4% 
less (which would still have situated them far 
above traditional averages), the region would 
have had an extra US$ 25 billion available in its 
external accounts, which would have made it 
much easier to meet the interest payments on the 
'For a more detailed analysis of these issues see KCLAC, 
Adjustment policies and renegotiation of the external debt (K/CEPAL./ 
c;.1299), Santiago, Chile, February 1984. 
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debt (amounting to some US$ 35 billion) without 
having to resort to the sharp contraction of im-
ports which had to be put into effect in the last 
two years. T h e absence of these conditions, 
however, together with the contraction suffered 
in external financing from private sources, made 
Latin America into a net exporter of capital, thus 
reversing a historial trend, in flagrant contradic-
tion with the capital-importer status appropriate 
to developing countries. 
The outline I have just given highlights the 
profound changes undergone by the centre-
periphery relationship, which has always been an 
important element in ECLAC'S analyses of Latin 
American development. Thus, from the 1950s 
onwards, the sluggishness of world trade and the , 
restrictions of the international markets created 
a favourable climate for the Latin American 
countries' decision to depend primarily on their 
internal markets and follow import substitution 
Faced with a crisis which had such far-reaching 
repercussions on the external income of the re-
gion, the countries were inevitably forced to 
make adjustments, with high economic and social 
costs. In view of such a difficult situation, it would 
certainly be Utopian to try to imagine a "painless" 
adjustment. But the question that must be asked 
here is whether the adjustment, besides being 
inevitable and painful, has been fair in terms of 
the distribution of its costs among the different 
sectors involved in the crisis, both at the domestic 
and at the international level. 
The adjustment has in fact assumed strongly 
recessive features, basically reflected in the re-
duction of imports in order to obtain a trade 
surplus with which to meet the external debt 
service commitments; the curtailment of spend-
ing, both for consumption and investment; the 
erosion of international reserves; and sharp de-
valuation. As a natural corollary of the fore-
going, the traditional pressures on prices were 
joined by those arising from the growing fiscal 
policies on a national and regional scale. As from 
the mid-1960s, however, world trade registered 
unprecedented growth which encouraged the 
application of export expansion and diversifica-
tion policies by the Latin American countries, 
thus giving a new profile to the region's external 
trade. From the first half of the 1970s onwards, 
the situation of international financial permis-
siveness mentioned earlier stimulated external 
indebtedness policies which made possible an ex-
pansion in spending, with different objectives 
and results, especially in terms of its economic 
and social productivity. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the intensification of the recessive cycle in 
the centres, together with the rise in interest rates 
and the drop in the terms of trade, sharply re-
duced the Latin American countries' capacity for 
reactivation, and this situation was further aggra-
vated by the contraction of the inflow of capital 
into the region. 
deficits which, on the one hand, stimulated infla-
tion and, on the other, led to serious cuts in 
public investment, particularly investment in-
tended for the social sphere. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that along with a process of destruc-
tion or underutilization of installed capital, a 
strong concentration of the negative effects of 
the crisis in the poorest sectors of the population 
has occurred. 
In applying its adjustment policies, the re-
gion used the orthodox mechanisms recom-
mended by the International Monetary Fund, 
which had to fit within the narrow limits imposed 
by a difficult payments situation and by an inter-
national financial community that was reluctant 
to grant new credits. In this context, the adjust-
ment policies could not be other than markedly 
recessive, especially in so far as hopes for a rapid 
recovery of the world economy, with favourable 
effects on interest rates and the terms of trade, 
did not come to fruition. 
No one could imagine a way out of the pre-
II 
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sent crisis that could bypass adjustments as pain-
ful as they are inevitable. However, the impact of 
international circumstances which are beyond 
the control of national governments, the delayed 
reaction of the external cycle and the far-
reaching economic and social costs involved in 
the adjustment have been causing growing dis-
satisfaction with the mechanism applied to carry 
this out. 
The highest-level political expression of this 
disquietude was provided at the recent Latin 
American Economic Conference convened in 
Quito at the beginning of 1984, by the President 
of Ecuador, Dr. Osvaldo Hurtado. The Declara-
tion and Plan of Action adopted at that Confer-
ence, brought the consideration of these prob-
lems into the political sphere, for the first time 
since the beginning of the most acute phase of 
the present crisis, and established the principle 
that the external debt service commitments and, 
hence, the intensity of the adjustment, should to 
a larger extent be the subject of proposals formu-
lated by the Latin American countries them-
selves. These proposals should basically take into 
account the need to maintain a certain economic 
growth rate and acceptable living conditions for 
their societies. 
The basis for this critical position is primarily 
a political one. Indeed, if the relations between 
the Latin American countries, on the one hand, 
and their creditors and the industrialized na-
tions, on the other, are not placed on a different 
political level, no matter what the relative weight 
of the domestic and international factors in shap-
ing the crisis, it will become almost impossible to 
handle. These considerations of a political na-
ture should, inter alia: a) call into question the 
long-term viability of a general adjustment pro-
cess in which all the countries are led simul-
taneously to reduce their imports and expand 
their exports, at a time when a growing and ever 
more subtle system of protectionism is being car-
ried forward by the industrialized countries; it is 
acknowledged that, although the deficit trade 
behaviour of the United States is an important 
and positive exception to this state of affairs, the 
criticism continues to be valid as regards the 
other countries with which the region trades; b) 
point up the fact that, while the various actors 
involved in the creation of the crisis —the debtor 
countries, the international banks, the industrial-
ized countries, international financial agencies 
and the very system of world economic relations 
itself— clearly have a share of the responsibility 
in this respect, the cost of the adjustment falls 
almost exclusively on the debtor countries; it is a 
situation in which the international banks not 
only have failed to assume a fair share of the costs 
of refinancing the debt, but also have increased 
their profit margin excessively via the costs of 
financial intermediation; at the same time, they 
have succeeded in having the International 
Monetary Fund maintain a supervisory presence 
with respect to the management of the debtor 
countries' domestic economic policy in order to 
ensure their ability to pay, while they have also 
managed to have State guarantees extended in 
many of these countries to almost all of their 
credits, including those to which government 
guarantees did not originally apply; c) draw atten-
tion to the abrupt restriction of external capital 
flows imposed by the international financial sys-
tem and the fact that Latin America has become a 
net capital exporter; this situation is felt to mili-
tate not only against a minimum degree of recov-
ery by the Latin American economy but also 
against the reactivation of the world economy 
itself. 
. The method of adjustment used by a num-
ber of Latin American countries has, further-
more, warranted theoretical criticism, which 
has been examined in the past by EGLAC and 
which has been repeated in some of its recent 
studies. 
"The magnitude, nature and persistence of 
recent external imbalances and their rela-
tionship to domestic imbalances suggest that 
the current theoretical models for analysing 
the balance of payments are based on various 
sets of unrealistic and decidedly restrictive 
assumptions, and have produced piecemeal 
and, at times, erroneous policy interpreta-
tions and recommendations with respect to 
the developments which have occurred in 
this sphere. In particular, there has been lit-
tle analysis of the determinants of private 
international financial flows or of the exter-
nal debt's impact on the national economy. 
In addition, given a ceteris paribus assumption 
in relation to world economic activity, inter-
national interest rates, etc., the policy pre-
scriptions put the burden of restoring a bal-
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ance on the 'problem country', with little or 
no recognition of the interdependence of the 
external imbalances among the countries 
with respect both to their causes and to the 
responsibility involved".2 
Despite the fact that the region has reacted 
very responsibly to this situation, taking mea-
sures to correct it which have had painful eco-
nomic, social and even political consequences, 
doubts persist as to the ability of the Latin Amer-
ican societies to continue to endure the sacrifices 
they are currently making. Because of this, in 
various financial and political centres attention 
has been called to the possible consequences of 
the Latin American countries' domestic situation 
and particularly to the repercussions which ex-
treme solutions would have on the stability of 
world financial markets. Some of the boldest and 
most innovative proposals for seeking global for-
mulas which go beyond the policies currently 
pursued have come from intellectual circles in 
the industrialized countries and, increasingly, 
from political leaders and economic authorities 
in the Latin American countries themselves. 
These proposals, however, have yet to influence 
the attitudes of the political authorities in the 
developed countries. 
One central topic for the immediate future is 
the establishment of global mechanisms to facili-
tate the servicing of the debt so as to provide 
leeway for a greater flow of imports and, by that 
means, to permit a process of reactivation in the 
Latin American economy. To these ends a set of 
measures have been proposed in general terms 
which are aimed at bringing about a considerable 
reduction in the costs of financial intermedia-
tion, the rescheduling of interest payments on 
the debt in a way which would not absorb too 
great a proportion of export earnings, and an 
extension of loan maturities. On this occasion, I 
will not enter into an analysis of these subjects, 
which have been discussed in other ECLAC 
documents.3 Suffice it to say that, under present 
2See Carlos Massad and Roberto Zahler, "The adjust-
ment process in the 1980s: the need for a global approach", in 
this issue of CEP AI. Review. 
3See Adjustment policies and renegotiation of the external debt, 
op. cit., pp. 80-91. 
circumstances, the financing of their external 
debt is the stumbling-block for most of the Latin 
American countries as far as any economic reac-
tivation policy is concerned. 
Nonetheless, these considerations indicate 
that one of the basic features of the new develop-
ment pattern which the region must follow in the 
future will be a lower degree of dependency on 
external financing. This, in turn, will greatly de-
pend upon the evolution of the countries' for-
eign trade and, particularly, on how successful 
they are in expanding their exports. It must be 
acknowledged here that the modest prospects 
for the international economy, and the slow 
growth in world trade which is likely to occur 
during coming years, will continue to severely 
limit Latin American exports. It is probable that 
this situation will continue to be compounded by 
the defects of the developed countries' growing 
neo-protectionism. Indeed, in recent years the 
process ofopening up trade, which characterized 
the centres' economic evolution during the post-
war period, has lost momentum and has been 
replaced by an increasingly variegated set of pro-
tectionist measures, discriminatory and lacking 
in transparency, which have caused a growing 
share of international trade to be carried on out-
side the sphere of the GATT regulations. This has 
jeopardized progress towards a new internation-
al division of labour at the world level, which was 
precisely one of the opportunities open to the 
developing countries for responding to the crisis. 
The neo-protectionism of the industrialized 
countries seriously threatens the chances which 
the countries of the region could have of reduc-
ing the external debt burden in the medium term 
by expanding their trade. 
A number of measures could be suggested 
for rectifying this situation. First of all, the Latin 
American countries should take concerted action 
to combat the various types of tariff spreads and 
non-tariff barriers recently put into effect by the 
industrialized countries. Secondly, a measure 
which is of great importance for Latin America is 
the approval of new rules regarding safeguard 
clauses which would allow them to be used only 
under exceptional circumstances, rather than in 
order to place unilateral restrictions on the re-
gion's exports when the latter begin to represent 
competititon for producers in the industrialized 
countries. Thirdly, the production and export 
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subsidies granted by the industrialized countries 
in such basic sectors as agriculture, livestock pro-
duction and industries important to Latin Amer-
ica should also be opposed, just as the de-
Certainly, it is no easy matter to provide a clear 
picture of the outlook for the international econ-
omy in the immediate future, nor, therefore, of 
the hypotheses which could serve as a basis for 
adjustment machinery sponsored by the interna-
tional financial community and IMP. In a recent 
article, Albert Bressand set forth the possible 
future prospects of the world economy as fol-
lows: 
"In the next few years, one can think in terms 
of two broad scenarios, depending on what 
relationship will prevail between the "real" 
economic sphere and the financial one. In 
the first, the optimistic one, the real economy 
will be able to grow faster than the size of the 
financial "deadweight" with which it is now 
burdened. If that were to happen, specific 
country or corporate situations could still be 
sources of difficulty but, on the whole, the 
debt overhang would gradually dissolve it-
self. Nothing more drastic than heavy re-
scheduling might be needed. The second 
broad scenario, however, looks more likely, 
at least in the absence of concerted recovery 
policies of the type described below, that 
policies of financial "adjustment" would conr 
verge toward deflation on a global scale and 
would increase rather than reduce the fun-
damental economic, social and political vul-
nerabilities. At some point, the weight of 
accumulated debt would be such that re-
pudiation could not be avoided, and might 
even be the only way out of an implosion 
trap".-1 
4Albert Bressand, "Mastering the 'World Economy"', 
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1983. 
veloped countries themselves closely monitor the 
use of subsidies by the developing countries. The 
benefits of the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) should also be expanded. 
These are the prospects from the standpoint 
of the developed countries, and it is a perspective 
which undeniably calls to mind the financial 
problems of the 1930s. 
These outlooks have their counterparts in 
the views of the immediate future held in the 
countries of the region. In the opinion of some 
observers among the monetary authorities of var-
ious Latin American countries, who share the 
viewpoint of their colleagues in the North, the 
rectivation of the United States economy will, in 
turn, have a reactivating effect on the rest of the 
industrial economies, which will give a new im-
petus to international trade and, therefore, to the 
external environment on which the developing 
countries' economies rely. This is what has been 
called the "locomotive theory". With a reduction 
in real interest rates and an improvement in the 
prices of the developing countries' export prod-
ucts, the debt problem could be managed on 
better terms and would leave room for initiating 
economic reactivation policies. On the other 
hand, there are viewpoints which call into ques-
tion the significance and durability of the recov-
ery in the large industrial centres, or at least the 
possibility of transmitting the recovery taking 
place in the United States in recent months to the 
other centres, much less to the periphery. From 
the first angle, the main features are the persis-
tence of high real interest rates, a slow rate of 
investment, unemployment and idle capacity in 
the industrialized countries, and an overvalued 
United States dollar. From the second, a remind-
er is given that in order for the recovery in the 
centres to be transmitted to the periphery, signi-
ficant effects will have to be produced on interest 
rates and the terms of trade, and external finan-
cial flows towards the region will have to be re-
III 
The immediate outlook 
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sumed. Certainly, if we consider the impact of 
the economic recovery in the United States on 
these three factors during 1983, the conclusions 
are not overly encouraging. The expected drop 
in real interest rates has not come about, there 
has been no pronounced reversal in the tendency 
of the terms of trade to deteriorate, nor has a 
positive reaction on the part of sources of private 
capital been observed, except to the extent strict-
ly necessary in order to contribute to the financ-
ing of a portion of the interest payments owed by 
the Latin American countries. 
Even so, one indispensable prerequisite for 
an economic recovery in the countries of the 
region is the recovery of the industrial econo-
mies. From this standpoint, what is occurring in 
the United States and probably, to a lesser de-
gree, in other OECD countries is a positive de-
velopment. This view of the situation, however, 
must be modified by the fact that the monetary 
and fiscal policies and high interest rates prevail-
ing in the United States are an important contrib-
uting factor to the contraction of global eco-
nomic activity and are reducing the opportuni-
ties for the developing world. At the same time, it 
is clear that the countries of the region should 
look for alternatives to the severe adjustment 
policies which they have implemented in recent 
years, seeking instead development strategies 
which stress economic growth. As noted above, 
the foregoing involves the adoption of mecha-
nisms by the international community which will 
make possible a more tolerable form of admin-
istering and refinancing these countries' exter-
nal debt. Such mechanisms would free a greater 
volume of resources for increasing their essential 
imports (particularly those linked to their de-
velopment processes), and should be applied 
concurrently with a greater degree of import 
substitution —although we know full well that 
these strategies have their limitations. On the 
external front, t rade and financial policies 
should be combined with one another and with 
domestic reactivation policies so that they can be 
brought to bear on the objectives of increasing 
investment, expanding basic imports and initiat-
ing a sustained recovery process in the Latin 
American countries. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that the rate of ex-
pansion of production and the room for man-
oeuvre in economic policy will continue to be 
restricted in many of our countries for a fairly 
long period of time because of external con-
straints. Accordingly, the growth rate will not 
only be lower than over the past two decades, but 
will depend far more closely on an increase in 
domestic saving, the fullest and most effective 
use of available human resources and installed 
capacity, and an increase in production devoted 
to covering internal demand. 
IV 
The medium-term outlook and its main determinants 
The foregoing considerations suggest that nei-
ther short-term economic policies nor the major 
objectives of the development strategy can re-
main unchanged by the effects and lesson of the 
crisis of the 1980s, just as the corresponding in-
struments will also have to be revised. Towards 
the end of the 1970s, it was thought that con-
cer ted action with respect to the different 
structural constraints which marked the past de-
velopment of the region could result in more 
dynamic economic growth rates and that, given 
such rates, the appropriate conditions could be 
created for laying the foundations for sustained 
economic development and the progressive solu-
tion of the mass of social problems which had 
mounted up. Today, the emergence of new and 
unforeseen problems and the atmosphere of un-
certainty surrounding the evolution of the world 
and Latin American economies, rather than 
allowing us to think in terms of an incrementalist 
and progressive process, draw our attention to 
the presence of severe breaks or discontinuities. 
Nevertheless, this should not lead us to adopt 
defeatist or despairing positions, but instead to 
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search more intensively for innovative answers to 
these new situations. 
The lessons of history teach us that great 
crises present both risks and opportunities. It 
would probably be unrealistic to postulate radical 
changes in the development policies of the Latin 
American countries in the middle of one of the 
worst recessions the region has undergone in this 
century and in view of the unpromising interna-
tional setting, which would make such changes 
politically and socially unfeasible. However, we 
must also remember that a crisis situation has 
often p receded the adopt ion of sweeping 
changes: in the United States, the New Deal was a 
response to the crisis of the 1930s; the economic 
recovery and integration of Europe, in turn, 
arose in response to the destruction caused by the 
war, while the development strategies based on 
the industr ial izat ion and "inward-directed 
growth" of the Latin American countries them-
selves also grew out of the Great Depression and 
the war. Thus, just as in that era, the current 
crisis could provide the basic elements for an 
in-depth revision of the development styles and 
economic policies of the Latin American coun-
tries. In order for this to happen, extreme ex-
periments whose economic and social costs could 
exceed the political tolerance of these societies 
would have to be avoided, and some measures of 
balance and rationality would have to be incorpo-
rated into the strategies in question in order to 
ensure their economic efficiency, by learning 
from the experience which has been gained. 
The analysis of the options available for such 
policies requires a dispassionate interpretation of 
the various experiences of the region in the re-
cent past and, in the light of these, the amount of 
leeway there can be for economic policy to oper-
ate in. Experience indicates that strategies which 
were initially inspired by the most progressive 
objectives and which were based on a broad con-
sensus ultimately lost that support because they 
did not attain a reasonable level of efficiency. 
There is also a general awareness that in recent 
years the external vulnerability of the Latin 
American economies has increased considerably 
and that the goverments' room to manoeuvre has 
decreased accordingly. The amount of leeway, 
however, is certainly not the same for all the 
countries of the region, because their socio-
political situations, economic structures and 
forms of insertion in the international setting are 
not the same either. What is important is to deter-
mine, within the proper analytical framework, 
the room for manoeuvre —the balance of limita-
tions and opportunities— available to each Latin 
American country. 
1. External determinants 
As in the past economic history of the region, the 
leeway enjoyed by the governments as regards 
policy options will continue to be linked to the 
type of relations which are established with the 
great centres. Predicting the future nature of 
these relations entails, first of all, setting out a 
hypothesis regarding the behaviour of the world 
economy and of international financial and trade 
flows over the medium and long term. 
The emergency situations in which we find 
ourselves as a result of the crisis make such an 
undertaking no ordinary matter in Latin Amer-
ica. Nevertheless, it is important that it be carried 
out. Measures for overcoming the crisis may 
appear to be reasonable if it is assumed that, 
when it is over, the world and Latin American 
economies will resume their course of growth 
within structures similar to those which prevailed 
during the past three decades, but they do not 
appear so reasonable if it is supposed that these 
economies will undergo sweeping changes both 
at the world and at the Latin American level. 
Studies concerning the present crisis are not de-
voting enough attention to the theory of long-
term or "secular" recessionary cycles. According 
to some observers, the world economy may be 
entering upon another downward phase of the 
cycles described by Kondratieff in the 1920s, 
characterized by the emergence of imbalances 
between the requirements of economic expan-
sion, on the one hand, and the supplies of food, 
raw materials, inputs and technology available to 
sustain this process, on the other. It is interesting 
to note that, if these historical cycles are indeed a 
fact, then their recessionary phase could not be 
overcome through a mere projection of past 
trends, but would call for a creative response. 
Schumpeter has already posited that the emer-
gence of new combinations of products, tech-
nologies and entrepreneurial behaviour is a nec-
essary prerequisite for coming out of a cycle's 
recessionary phase. The possibility that we are 
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experiencing such a phase is supported by the 
circumstance that factors related to productivity, 
investment, technological innovation, human re-
source training and the emergence of new pro-
ductive activities as dynamic elements in the de-
velopment process have come to be of increasing 
importance in the evolution of the world econ-
omy. Since this hypothesis may well be correct, 
it behoves us to look beyond the adjustment po-
licies in order to prepare ourselves for future 
conditions, while brighter, or at least more dyna-
mic, prospects are opened up for the developing 
countries, to the extent that they have the capac-
ity to respond actively to the new situation. 
Whatever the likelihood of such an outcome, 
it would be unduly optimistic to suppose that 
during the course of the 1980s the region will be 
able to gain access to a volume of external capital 
flows similar to that which existed during the past 
decade. It is more appropriate to think in terms 
of a much more restrictive external context and 
of a mood of greater restraint in the design of 
resource allocation policies. The present decade 
will clearly be marked by a pronounced selectiv-
ity on the part of the resources of international 
credit, both in terms of the countries involved 
and the final destination of resources, and this 
selectivity will surely characterize international 
economic policies as well. 
I have already said that the evolution of in-
ternational trade will have a decisive influence on 
the external context. The application of effective 
and lasting solutions can only come as the result 
of an increase in the capacity for generating for-
eign exchange, brought about by an expansion in 
the volume and an increase in the prices of ex-
ports. This is why it is essential to ask ourselves 
about the behaviour of international markets. 
Will they tend to become more open or will cur-
rent protectionist trends become more pro-
nounced? In this regard, the document submit-
ted by EC1.AC and SELA at the request of the Presi-
dent of Ecuador states that; 
"Latin American exports of basic commod-
ities and manufactures —the expansion of 
which is essential for the region's develop-
ment— face in the markets of the industrial-
ized countries a set of tariff barriers (graded 
according to the degree of processing of the 
exports) as well as non-tariff barriers. Both 
types of protection have a limiting and discrim-
inatory character and are gradually bring-
ing about a situation where the central coun-
tries have acquired the capacity to manage as 
they wish their trade with the developing 
countries and especially Latin America. This 
management may take place in a selective 
and non-continuous manner or, if necessary, 
may be broader, more intensive and more 
frequent".5 
A no more optimistic view holds away in the 
North. In the opinion of Bressand, "the age of 
free trade as an organizing principle may well be 
over". He goes on to say that, in his judgement, 
"this does not imply... that free trade, from a 
normative point of view, is not desirable. It is not 
a matter of prescription, but of diagnosis."6 
Given this situation, deep concern must be 
expressed with respect to the possible conse-
quences of an exacerbation of protectionism and 
of an even greater loss of transparency in inter-
national trade, in view of the imperative need for 
the Latin American countries to increase their 
exports. All of the above suggests that it would be 
unwise to predict trade conditions very different 
from the present ones. On the contrary, just the 
maintenance of those conditions, without any 
further deterioration, would seem to be a signifi-
cant achievement. Against the same backdrop, it 
even appears inappropriate to anticipate world 
trade growth rates resembling those of the 1960s 
and 1970s, when annual rates of 8% were 
reached. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the 
dramatic decrease in international trade which 
took place in the early years of this decade, it 
seems possible that there might be a modest re-
covery, which would have favourable effects on 
the external trade of Latin America and the 
evolution of the terms of trade. 
In referring to external determinants, I be-
gan by saying that the first problem which must 
be cleared up relates to the nature of the cycle 
being experienced by the world economy and to 
the possibility that we are witnessing the end of 
5See, Enr ique V. Iglesias and Carlos Alzamora 
Traverso, "Bases for a Latin American response to the inter-
national economic crisis", in CEPA/. Review No. 20, August 
1983, p. 42. 
6A. Bressand, op. cit. 
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one prolonged cycle and the commencement of 
another. I also stated that this hypothesis would 
open up new prospects for Latin America. Hence 
the importance of reflecting upon the effects that 
the structural changes now occurring in the pro-
duction and consumption patterns of the large 
industrial centres will have on international eco-
nomic relations, the international division of 
labour and the structure of comparative advan-
tages on the basis of which the developing coun-
tries have operated in recent decades. The pat-
tern of industrial expansion which prevailed in 
the advanced countries dur ing the postwar 
period is becoming worn out, as demonstrated by 
the decrease in the sector's profitability, the de-
cline of the industries which led the process 
—such as the iron and steel and the metal manu-
factures industries— and the resulting trans-
formation of production structures. In contrast 
with the past, when technological innovations 
were often stimulated by market forces, current 
transformations appear to be prompted by tech-
nological change. The great strides forward in 
knowledge recently made and the rising educa-
tional level of the labour force have combined 
with the intensification of competition among 
the great industrial centres, the need to develop 
technology which is appropriate to the energy 
shortage and the necessity of maintaining the 
ecological balance. It should therefore come as 
no surprise that there is a demonstrable pre-
eminence of "technical progress" and "efficien-
cy" in the political and economic "discourse" at 
the national and international levels. This pre-
eminence of technical progress causes the lead-
ership of industrial development to be assumed 
by new sectors such as electronics, biological en-
gineering and computer science, to name only a 
few. This, in turn, influences social relation in the 
centres and their linkages with the periphery. 
It should be remembered that one of the 
major causes of the changes being undergone by 
the centres is the growing competition of manu-
factures from the developing countries. At the 
same time, we know very little about the impact 
which these changes will have on the internation-
7See Femando Fajnzylber, "La industrialización trunca 
de América Latina", Mexico City, 1983, p, 271. 
al insertion of the countries of the region. It 
could jeopardize their potential advantages in 
food production or in the provision of inexpen-
sive manpower, but could also broaden their 
opportunities for gaining access to the latest tech-
nology and for participating on a more diversi-
fied basis in a new international division of 
labour. The world is in the midst of a third in-
dustrial revolution, which is certain to give rise to 
new types of relations between the centres and 
the periphery, and which will surely entail some 
dangers but also some opportunities; it is im-
portant that these should be understood and 
anticipated so that they may be incorporated into 
the design of the development strategies of the 
Latin American countries. 
The major trends in the contemporary inter-
national system are another factor of external 
origin that has influenced and will continue to 
influence the periphery's relations with the cen-
tres. The increase in interdependence repre-
sented by the many types of links existing among 
the different groups of countries by virtue of an 
increasingly broad variety of interests has turned 
the traditional pattern of centre-periphery rela-
tions into something more diversified and more 
complex, and, although on the one hand it has 
heightened the external vulnerability of the de-
veloping countries, on the other hand it has ex-
panded their range of possibilities. The emer-
gence of global problems such as those related to 
energy, the environment, arms, etc., has also 
helped to involve the developing countries to a 
greater extent in the solution of those problems. 
The recrudescense of East-West tensions and the 
attempts to extrapolate them to the various de-
veloping regions of the world have also had an 
influence —generally negative— on North-
South relations. 
2. Domestic determinants 
Although the traditional influence of external 
factors on Latin American development has be-
come more pronounced in recent years, the 
markedly restrictive trends being projected on to 
the international scene indicate that the options 
open to these countries will depend —perhaps to 
a greater degree than in the past— on a number 
of domestic determinants. The first such factors 
relate to the long-standing structural shortcom-
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ings which are summed up in the region's eco-
nomic and social underdevelopment. Thus, the 
still inadequate rates of capital formation, the 
weakness of the countries' structures of produc-
tion, unbalanced and incomplete industrial de-
velopment, the backwardness of agriculture and 
the limitations of technological development 
continue to be features of the Latin American 
economic picture. The trend towards concentra-
tion in income distribution also persists, and 
there are still no solutions to the major problems 
posed by the inequality among different social 
groups, the marginality of broad sectors of our 
societies and the insufficient capacity of the econ-
omies to generate employment; what is more, 
these problems have even tended to become 
more acute, at least in relative terms. These are 
the elements included by Raúl Prebisch in his 
description of the syndrome of peripheral and 
imitative capitalism which has prevailed in the 
countries of the region during recent decades. 
In addition to these difficulties, the problem 
of the acceleration of inflation, which has in-
creased notably in recent years, is particularly 
severe in the majority of the countries, in close 
connection with the problems described above. 
These inflationary pressures, which are very dif-
ficult to handle even when it is a matter of "old-
established inflation", can become much harder 
to control in countries which have only recently 
fallen victim to this syndrome with its inevitable 
social and even political traumas. Recognition of 
these facts makes it even more essential to have 
effective international co-operation institutions, 
which, by eventually attenuating the repercus-
sion of these problems, may provide the coun-
tries with greater leeway for reducing whatever 
depressive effects of anti-inflationary policies are 
likely to be superimposed on the recessive im-
pacts of adjustment policies. 
The restrictions imposed by the latter may, 
as a result of the need to service the external debt, 
continue to be one of the most rigid determinants 
of the options facing the Latin American coun-
tries in the longer term. Even if interest rates or 
the terms of trade improve, the servicing of the 
debt will continue to be very burdensome and to 
absorb a substantial share of whatever resources 
the region may generate. It must be borne in 
mind that, as things now stand, the majority of 
the debtor countries must allocate some 30% of 
their export earnings to interest payments, an 
o b l i g a t i o n which ce r t a in ly cons t i t u t e s a 
t remendous curtailment of their investment 
capacity and a kind of mortgage limiting their 
future development. 
However, the presence of these problems, 
both old and new, should not lead us to overlook 
the notable development experienced by Latin 
America over the past three decades and its sig-
nificance from the point of view of the region's 
capacity to respond to the crisis and tackle new 
options. In the statements I made in Guatemala 
City, La Paz and Montevideo, I analysed the 
growth and change experienced by the Latin 
American economies during that period and 
pointed out how they helped to explain what on 
other occasions I described as the region's in-
creased capacity to defend itself against the con-
tingencies of the external cycle. I believe the vio-
lent impact of the crisis on the region in the past 
two years due to the external and internal factors 
to which I have already referred has not cancel-
led out the advances made in the past thirty 
years, nor has it vitiated that increased defensive 
capacity I mentioned, so that my earlier analyses 
are still valid. At the Montevideo meeting in 
1981, I said: 
"To judge the magnitude and unity of this 
growth and transformation process it is 
enough to repeat that in the course of the 
past three decades the total product of Latin 
America increased five-fold in real terms 
while that of manufacturing rose more than 
six-fold. At the same time—and in particular 
during the previous decade— agriculture 
advanced considerably and showed substan-
tial diversification, financial activities were 
expanded and modernized, and the invest-
ment coefficient rose gradually but persis-
tently. Of even greater importance, howev-
er, is that over those thirty years —and again 
with greater force in recent years— both the 
education level and the skills structure of the 
labour force improved markedly in virtually 
all the countries of the region. As a result of 
these advances and changes, Latin America 
now has a broader, more highly diversified 
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and flexible production base than in the 
past".8 
I do not think it necessary here to analyse this 
process in greater depth, since I have referred to 
it more extensively in statements made in the 
past. I should, however, like to note that the 
It would be pretentious to present a new econ-
omic paradigm for Latin America at this time. I 
have already stated my grounds for believing this 
cannot be done. There are many compelling 
reasons for being modest and prudent in these 
circumstances. The most important, of course, is 
the well-known diversity of situations in the 
different countries of the region; xhe difference 
which exists between countries as big as conti-
nents (such as Brazil) and the micro-States of the 
Caribbean is enough to discourage any general-
ized scheme. In addition to this reason there is 
the no less convincing one of the unknown quan-
tities represented by the process of change and 
the economic policies of the big industrial cen-
tres, and hence of the shape which relations be-
tween them and the Latin American countries 
might assume in the future. Recognition of these 
limitations does not detract, however, from the 
importance of the task of using alternative 
medium and long-term working hypotheses and 
scenarios and moving forward on the basis of a 
set of non-controversial points around which a 
future development pattern might emerge. 
These points are related both to the major de-
velopment objectives and to the overhauling of 
the instruments of economic policy. Without 
attempting to deal with them exhaustively, I 
should like to refer to certain aspects which 
appear most relevant. 
8See Enrique V. Iglesias, "Development and equity. The 
challenge of the 1980s", in CEPAI. Review No, 15, December 
1981, p. 15. 
growth and transformation of the Latin Amer-
ican economies and societies represents, together 
with the negative factors I have already men-
tioned, one of the basic issues which the new 
development strategies of the Latin American 
countries should take as their starting-point. 
1. Concerning the objectives 
of a development policy 
It seems important to draw attention to three 
objectives which development policies should 
seek in the future: greater efficiency of the econ-
omy, accompanied by a considerable increase in 
the rate of development; greater equity in the 
distribution of the fruits of growth; and greater 
autonomy of the development process. 
These three objectives are of course very 
closely related, but are not always easily brought 
into harmony with one another, as the evidence 
of history shows. It is therefore worth reflecting 
on the experience of the Latin American coun-
tries with regard to these options. Those which 
tended to favour economic efficiency at any cost 
sacrificed social progress, giving rise to an accu-
mulation of problems which finally jeopardized 
the initial progress made and created explosive 
situations from the political point of view. In 
other cases, where the development strategy con-
centrated solely on social objectives, it resulted in 
uncontrollable forms of economic populism 
which shortly fell victim to the general inefficien-
cy of the production system. Thus, experience 
shows that the most feasible options are those 
which, instead of giving unilateral priority to 
some of these objectives over the others, seek to 
reach all the goals harmoniously, taking a global 
view which can be achieved only within the 
framework of an integral economic and social 
development project in which the thrust is bal-
anced, serene and realistic. 
V 
Development policies: Some options 
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a) Growth 
As regards the growth objective, it is worth 
mentioning some ECLAC publications in which 
possible scenarios for the longer term are pro-
posed. One of these analyses the impact that 
would be produced on the region by a growth 
rate of the product of the order of 3.5% in the 
OECD countries up to the end of this decade, with 
annual growth of the region's exports by about 
3% and a real interest rate of close to 6%. On this 
hypothesis (which assumes more favourable con-
ditions than those prevailing at present), the re-
gion could achieve average growth of approxi-
mately 4% a year during the rest of the 1980s. 
With that growth rate, Latin America would not 
return to its 1980 levels of per capita income until 
1990, so that it would have lost a whole decade 
from the point of view of its economic and social 
progress, with the consequent worsening of the 
living conditions of the population. These con-
siderations warn of the ineluctable need to 
embark upon policies and programmes qualita-
tively and quantitatively different from those 
which are nurturing this tendency, so that the 
problems created by extreme poverty, failure to 
meet basic needs, and unemployment can be 
dealt with more effectively. 
It is important to stress, as I already noted, 
that on any medium-term hypothesis, external 
opportunities will be much more restricted than 
in the past. This means that the development of 
the countries of the region should be based to a 
greater extent on a process of internal accumula-
tion, the mobilization of their own resources and 
the use of their own markets, instead of relying 
basically on the inflow of foreign capital and on 
external markets. In other words, as noted in the 
documents prepared by the Secretariat of the 
Commission, the region will have to learn to "do 
more with less".9 This calls, on the one hand, for 
a substantial increase in domestic savings and, on 
the other, for greater efficiency in the use of 
available resources, especially labour and in-
stalled production capacity. 
"See ECLAC, The international economic crisis and Latin 
America's capacity to respond to it (FA:KPAIA;.1249), presented at 
the Meeting of Latin American Personalities on the world 
crisis and Latin America (Bogotá, Colombia, May 1983), San-
tiago. Chile (March 1984), p. 60. 
The concept of efficiency has had various 
connotations in economic literature and in the 
attempts made to incorporate it into economic 
policies. In recent years this efficiency was sought 
basically through the market forces and external 
openness. While it is true that some of those 
attempts have been successful in terms of the 
achievement of greater competitiveness of activi-
ties exposed to competition from the external 
market, it is also clear that, when applied uni-
laterally and in circumstances such as those 
which now prevail in the international economy, 
this policy may produce the opposite results to 
those expected. Thus, if not accompanied by 
coherent domestic policies and support systems 
appropriate for the stage of development which 
each country has reached, it could lead to a se-
vere weakening of their production capacity. 
In mixed economies like those of the major-
ity of the Latin American countries, it is neces-
sary to bring the quest for efficiency through the 
use of market forces into harmony with the 
presence of the State, which will act on the basis 
of global policies supporting the systems of pro-
duction and very consistent in the handling of 
the main macroeconomic variables. 
b) Equity 
In the development of Latin America, the 
tendency towards inequality in the distribution 
of income is a chronic problem. Suffice it to re-
call, in this regard, the enormous size of the social 
sectors suffering from critical poverty, unem-
ployment, or underemployment. These and 
other difficulties have been aggravated as a result 
of the recession of the 1980s. One of the impera-
tives of development strategies, therefore, both 
immediately and in the long term, is to give more 
importance to objectives linked to equity of 
growth —which, moreover, it is essential to pur-
sue if the necessary expansion of domestic mar-
kets is to be achieved. 
As regards immediate goals, decisive import-
ance is attached to the design of programmes for 
supplying the most urgent deficiencies, such as 
the lack of employment or of goods to satisfy 
basic needs, by ensuring that available human 
resources are mobilized mor e effectively and that 
better use is made of idle production capacity. In 
the medium and long term, it is essential to seek 
LATIN AMERICA: CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS / Enrique V. ¡gh 23 
to enhance the quality of investment so that, 
in addition to making economic growth more dy-
namic, it will also help to make good the big social 
shortcomings which now mar development. In 
all these areas, the region has already outgrown 
the simplistic approaches which relied merely on 
the nominal redistribution of income. In recent 
years, the Latin American countries have carried 
out a number of experiments which show that 
there are specific mechanisms differentiated, 
according to the particular cases, for pragmati-
cally reconciling equity with efficiency.10 
c) Autonomy 
In addition to the objectives related to dy-
namic and equitable growth, there is the need to 
seek a reasonable margin of autonomy in the 
development process, without which the coun-
tries are at the mercy of external forces and do not 
manage to acquire the necessary ability to take 
advantage of the potential benefits of their inter-
national economic relations. If the countries of 
the region are to be able to develop ways of fitting 
more actively and independently into the exter-
nal economy, that economy must begin to show 
signs of becoming less restrictive than in recent 
years, by for example, putting into practice some 
of the structural reforms which the developing 
countries have long been proposing. However, 
there is also a need for a more dynamic, prag-
matic and selective development strategy on the 
part of the latter countries. In addition to the 
increase in the importance of external factors 
and the consequently greater international vul-
nerability of our economies, note should be taken 
of numerous successful examples of the manage-
ment of our external economic relations in cer-
tain specific sectors.11 
10On the subject of the most effective policies for eradi-
cating extreme poverty, see ECLA/UNDP ¿Se puede superar la 
pobreza? Realidad y perspectiva en América Latina, Santiago, 
Chile, 1980, and ECLA/UNICEF, Pobreza crítica en la niñez: Amér-
ica Latina y el Caribe, Santiago, Chile, 1981. 
1
 'See, in this respect, the studies published by the ECLA/ 
UNDP Capital Goods Project, such as La situación y las perspecti-
vas de ¡a producción y el abastecimiento de bienes de capital en 
América Latina (E/CEPAL/R.343), Santiago, September 1983; 
the publications of the ECLA Export Promotion and Develop-
ment Project, particularly the final report of the round table 
The autonomy of the Latin American coun-
tries' development would also be considerably 
strengthened if the processes of integration and 
regional co-operation were made more dynamic, 
since they are called upon to play a role of re-
newed importance in the development strategies 
which the countries formulate to confront an 
international scenario that is restrictive and un-
certain. Similar factors should be taken into 
account in redoubling efforts to increase Latin 
America's participation in the process of South-
South co-operation. 
2. Regarding some key instruments 
Along with the reformulation of the objectives of 
development policies, some of their key instru-
ments will also have to be reviewed. At this time, I 
will confine myself to a few comments about 
some of them which seem to be the most impor-
tant for confronting the challenges posed by a 
new type of economic and social development 
and which are related to the driving forces be-
hind economic growth, to the role of the State 
and of planning in the process, and to external 
economic relations. 
a) The driving forces of growth 
What should be the driving forces behind 
economic growth in this new stage of regional 
development? When this topic is considered, the 
discussion tends to become divided into two 
usually opposing sides in the intellectual and 
political debate: that which stresses policies based 
on the domestic market, and that which opts for 
the opening up of the economies and the expan-
sion of exports. The first position reflects to some 
extent Latin America's diverse experiences with 
meeting on the financing of exports of manufactures in Latin 
America (E/CEPAL/R.282, in Spanish only), Santiago, Chile, 
1981; the final report of the Latin American meeting of 
export credit guarantee agencies, Santiago, Chile, 1983, and 
Elfinanciamiento de las exportaciones en América Latina, Estudios 
e Informes de la CEPAL, 18 (E/CEPAL/G.1236), Santiago, 1983 
and América Latina y el Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional, 
Buenos Aires, Belgrano Press, 1982 (outcome of another 
joint UNDP/ECLA project, the Programme of Joint Studies on 
the International Relations of Latin America (RIAL)). 
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development during the period since the war. 
The advocates of the second viewpoint, whose 
popularity has been more recent, commonly 
point to conspicuous examples of successes, such 
as those achieved by the countries of Southeast 
Asia, without duly explaining all the central ele-
ments that have played a role in the development 
policy of those countries and which accompanied 
the birth and consolidation of its export-based 
growth model. They generally omit all those ele-
ments relating to government support policies 
for the systems of production, the selective pro-
tection applied in respect of the domestic market, 
the income redistribution and land ownership 
policies, and the specific geographical and poli-
tical features of their economies. In the case of 
Latin America, when discussing these options, 
another gap in the debate usually occurs, in that 
insufficient consideration is given to the substan-
tial differences existing among the countries of 
the region with respect to the size of their econo-
mies, their resource endowment, their level of 
development and their forms of international 
linkage —all of which are essential elements in 
defining the context for the discussion of these 
policies. 
Over time, Latin America has adopted di-
verse options in connection with its development 
process, and these have taken on inidivual fea-
tures according to the countries and the different 
historical stages in which they have been chosen. 
Thus in the 1950s, faced with strong population 
pressures and growing urbanization, moved by 
the desire to incorporate technical progress into 
their production processes, and confronted with 
some international markets which were either 
closed or lacking in transparency, most of the 
countries in the region opted for industrializa-
tion based on the utilization of domestic markets 
as the basic driving force for growth. This option 
had to face severe constraints after a time, due to 
the predominance of limited and disconnected 
markets. At that point, ECLAC drew attention to 
the dangers of these constraints and, as early as 
the mid-1950s, proposed the first experiments in 
expanding these markets by means of the estab-
lishment of regional or subregional integration 
schemes. Later on Raúl Prebisch, who played a 
leading role in the formulation of these propos-
als, advocated from his position as Secretary-
General of UNCTAD the opening-up of world 
markets to exports of manufactures from the 
peripheral countries. In this way, originally as 
the result of contingent past experiences, the 
first stages of Latin American industrialization 
took place. Any description of this phase must 
not, of course, overlook the excessive protection-
ism indulged in by some countries and the anti-
export and anti-agricultural bias which was pre-
sent in some of these policies. 
In more recent periods, with a more dynamic 
and open international market, the countries of 
the region were able to apply systematic and con-
sistent policies which led them to expand their 
exports actively, largely as a consequence of their 
prior stages of industrialization, which gave rise 
to a significant body of experience on the part of 
the public authorities and greater entrepreneu-
rial capacity in this field. This provided momen-
tum, with considerable success in some cases, for 
the expansion and diversification of exports of 
manufactures, so that the international markets 
came to play an even more important role among 
the factors which stimulated demand and pro-
moted development. Just as the industrialization 
policies based on import substitution encoun-
tered certain constraints and ultimately shut 
themselves u p within highly protect ionist 
frameworks, however, these policies of opening-
up to the exterior also erred in some cases by 
committing definite excesses as regards the eli-
mination of protectionism and the reduction of 
the State's promotional role. As Streeten noted 
very perceptively some time ago, the inefficient 
use of resources may be due to causes which have 
no direct or even indirect connection with indus-
trialization based on a high degree of protection-
ism. It is just as possible to have inefficient export 
expansion policies as it is to have inefficient im-
port substitution policies.12 
When one analyses the slump and the set-
back in the evolution of the Latin American eco-
nomies in recent years, with their aftermath of 
social and economic effects, as well as the ex-
tremely serious problems created by foreign in-
debtedness and the currently existing interna-
tional uncertainty, it must be concluded that se-
l2See Paul Streeten, "Outward-looking industrialization 
and trade strategies", North-South Round Table, 1982. 
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rious mistakes were frequently committed in 
leaving the dynamics of growth entirely up to 
external stimuli. Under such circumstances, and 
always allowing for the major differences ex-
isting among the various countries, priorities 
should be given among the generators of growth, 
in the future, to those connected with the en-
largement of the domestic market on all fronts. 
This attitude should not fail to take account, 
however, of the positive experiences of the im-
mediate past, nor should it accept a repetition of 
already known sources of inefficiency that would 
end up by eroding this process. For that reason it 
is important to recognize that better utilization of 
the domestic potential of our economies must 
necessarily be linked to a growing degree of ex-
ternal openness, albeit of a more dynamic and 
selective type than in the past. The latter involves 
the intelligent use of government action, the em-
ployment of the countries' import capacity, and, 
at the same time, a vigorous effort on behalf of 
the expansion and diversification of exports of 
both traditional and manufactured goods. With 
the two objectives—better utilization of domestic 
markets and selective opening-up to the ex-
terior— thus conceived, an endeavour must be 
made to find ways in which the two may be com-
bined in accordance with the individual situa-
tions of the different countries, so that they be-
come complementary, rather than antagonistic, 
sources of growth. 
The strengthening of the domestic markets 
also involves giving an impetus to the region's 
agricultural development, which is far from hav-
ing reached its physical and technological 
bounds, and which could give Latin America a 
privileged position within the Third World in 
this area. It also involves, of course, an explora-
tion of the new possibilities for industrial de-
velopment, both in the production of consumer 
goods to meet the people's basic needs and in the 
development of more complex activities in which 
the region is lagging behind —such as the pro-
duction of capital goods— or which would afford 
a possibility of more rapid access to the new tech-
nologies. Economic complementarity among the 
countries of the region should constitute a basic 
element of this policy, especially as regards these 
more complex sectors. In reconciling the aims of 
strengthening domestic markets and achieving a 
selective opening-up of the economies, a deter-
min ing factor will be the development of 
appropriate, more dynamic technological poli-
cies that are accorded more priority than in the 
past. 
Viewed in a historical perspective, the debate 
regarding the different options that should be 
favoured as the generator of growth appears to 
be too simplistic and removed from the historical 
situations experienced by those countries which 
are today put forward as examples of alternative 
options. Nor must it be forgotten that each coun-
try's take-off point strongly affects the changes 
which it is capable of making in its development 
strategies, not only on the economic but also on 
the political and social level. Some projects aimed 
at b r i n g i n g about deep - roo ted s t ruc tura l 
changes based on the domestic market, for the 
benefit of the majority of the population, ended 
up by jeopardizing the efficiency of the produc-
tion system, creating strong inflationary pres-
sures and genera t ing serious external bot-
tlenecks. 
One of the major tasks facing the region is to 
seek, within each country, a dynamic balance be-
tween the strengthening of the domestic market 
and an external openness capable of generating 
increasing amounts of foreign exchange earn-
ings. This balance calls for the execution of 
structural changes in the orientation of invest-
ment and in macroeconomic policies. Under 
these circumstances it is more necessary than 
ever to have international mechanisms for co-
operation capable of giving substantial and im-
aginative support to the efforts of the region's 
countries in the difficult task of reallocating re-
sources, strengthening their capacity of accumu-
lation and imbuing their production systems with 
a greater measure of flexibility in order to enable 
them to face up to the changing conditions of the 
external cycle. 
b) Modernization of the State 
A basic element in the new development 
policies of our countries will necessarily be the 
modernization of the State. In the future, the 
latter should more deliberately support the cen-
tral objectives of development policies, control to 
a greater extent the process of external opening 
up, and mediate among the complex and con-
flicting demands of the different social groups. 
At the same time, it should intensify the efficien-
cy and selectivity of its activities. 
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The topic of the State is not new in intellec-
tual and political discussion, either at the world 
or at the Latin American level. In recent years the 
need to modernize the State has become one of 
the major challenges both to capitalist economies 
and to countries with centrally planned econo-
mies. In one case, it was a matter of the crisis of 
the "Welfare State", while in the other, it was a 
question of the crisis of the bureaucratic State. 
The analysis of the Latin American situation 
could be en r i ched by those expe r i ences , 
although they contain some elements which are 
peculiar to the countries in question. In this part 
of the world the State was not the result of a nation-
al project, but of the superimposition of several 
subprojects which were designed to respond 
pragmatically to the circumstances of the mo-
ment; they did so by accumulating in the State a 
growing number of heterogeneous functions 
without any overall view of the essential objec-
tives of its action or the most efficient way of 
achieving them. In this way there was a gradual 
enlargement of the functions traditionally exer-
cised by the liberal State, and its action began to 
extend to the vast and complex field of mac-
roeconomic policies and the management of a 
significant portion of the country's resources and 
its production activities. The results, in many 
cases, were inefficiency and incoherence. At the 
same time, and as a natural outcome of the re-
gion's process of development over the past 30 
years, civil society enlarged and became quite 
diversified in those countries, acquiring a grow-
ing capacity for handling an increasingly broad 
range of interests and competing with the State 
for their management. 
The growing participation which the State 
necessarily assumed in the distribution struggle 
among the various social groups frequently had a 
great deal to do with its expansion and crisis. As I 
stated a moment ago, the limitations on the 
State's action in Latin America today are not 
quite the same as those which shaped the crisis of 
the "Welfare State" in the industrialized coun-
tries. In the latter case, the crisis of the State was 
due mainly to excessive social expenditure, after 
this had played a significant role in invigorating 
the economic development of those countries 
during the post-war period. In the case of Latin 
America, the social policies of the State were 
aimed at meeting the demands of different social 
groups, but in the long run this tended to go 
beyond its capacity for action, because a multi-
plicity of particularistic policies intended to chan-
nel resources toward given groups were accumu-
lated and superimposed on one another. Hence 
the reform of the State in Latin Americanas re-
gards its social function, constitutes another of 
the requisites for attaining a more egalitarian 
growth with full participation by all. 
The criticisms expressed in connection with 
the State, from the ideological standpoint, tend 
either to consider that everything the State does 
is bad by definition or to demand that it should 
assume the majority of the functions necessary 
for furthering economic and social development. 
In the former case it is held that the State should 
be relieved of all those functions (save for the 
traditional ones), and that they should be left to 
the automatic operation of the market. In the 
latter, the State would once again be strongly 
present in each of the sectors involved in the 
development process, in a way not significantly 
different from that followed in its early stages. 
The experience of recent years, however, clearly 
shows that neither everything the State does is 
bad, nor should it carry out all development pro-
jects. At the same time, it has also become clear 
that market forces, while capable of introducing 
a greater degree of efficiency into the economic 
system, cannot of themselves provide answers to 
the complex problems of modern society —espe-
cially in the area of social needs—, nor can they 
foresee or anticipate the course of events; as a 
result, they lack the "social horizon" and "time 
horizon" which are essential for directing the 
process of development in the medium and long 
run. 
Under the existing critical conditions, in 
which a high degree of efficiency is required 
from the entire economic system in order to 
make a new development project feasible, a thor-
ough revision must be undertaken of both the 
objectives and the instruments on which the 
State's action is based. This revision should ex-
tend both to the formulation of macroeconomic 
policies and to the management of the resources 
and production activities entrusted to it. The 
management of any mixed economy must neces-
sarily rest on the full and active utilization of all 
the instruments of macroeconomic policy avail-
able to governments, with the greatest degree of 
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coherency possible. At the same time, no de-
velopment project will be feasible unless it is in-
scribed within an overall view of the national 
economy and its external context, and within 
certain medium and long-term forecasts on 
which a modern system of national planning can 
be based. 
With the same criterion, an effort should be 
made to ensure that the management of State 
enterprises, which with the passing of the years 
have become one of the main sources of the Fiscal 
instability of the region's governments, attains a 
maximum degree of efficiency. Inasmuch as in 
many cases these enterprises account for a con-
siderable proportion of the country's productive 
capital, it would not be possible to enhance the 
efficiency of the economic system in general 
without first achieving a growing degree of effi-
ciency in that part of the system. 
The modernization of the Latin American 
State is certainly not an easy matter, and involves 
decisions ofa political nature which are bound to 
come into frequent conflict with vested interests, 
with the views of certain leaders, or with the 
expectations of particular social groups. The 
need to overcome the temptations to move to-
wards either a populist State or a laissez-faire State 
and to progress instead towards a State vigorous-
ly committed to economic and social objectives 
without any decline in its efficiency and contribu-
tion to the general vitality of the system, is seen at 
present to be one of the major political tasks of 
Latin America. This new State will be better 
equipped to reconcile economic efficiency with 
social equity in its policies, while at the same time 
creating a system of incentives and disincentives 
which persuades the other major agent of the 
development process —the private sector— to 
modernize itself and contribute to economic 
growth within the objectives of general interest. 
c) External economic relations 
In the foregoing considerations the crucial 
importance of the external sector in the coming 
stages of the region's development has been 
clearly brought out. Certainly it is nothing new to 
underscore the significance of the relationship 
between internal development and the external 
sector. In the first place, it is obvious that the 
surmounting of the existing payment problems 
will depend in the final instance on an increase in 
the capacity for generating foreign exchange 
earnings by means of trade. Secondly, in earlier 
paragraphs it was maintained that the very en-
largement of the domestic markets will depend 
on the capacity to generate foreign exchange at 
the rate required for the efficient progress of 
that enlargement. 
This makes it essential to act on three simul-
taneous and complementary fronts: that of the 
efficacy of export promotion policies; that of the 
strengthening of the regional market; and that of 
full exploitation of the international markets. 
The events of recent years made it possible to 
advance and acquire experience in the coherent 
management of export promotion policies; they 
also made it possible to appreciate the depen-
dence of the latter on clear and sustained stimuli 
deriving from adequate price systems and sup-
port for both internal promotion and penetra-
tion of the international markets. The results of 
experience with exports in the 1970s, which 
are certainly instructive despite the costs of the 
overpromotion observed in some cases, leave no 
doubt as to the existence of a considerable poten-
tial and, in some cases, an idle capacity that 
should be mobilized. 
A clear definition of the role of the regional 
market is undoubtedly necessary, for in the pres-
ent circumstances regional co-operation is espe-
cially important. It would be Utopian to expect it 
to furnish a solution to all our problems, but it 
would likewise be futile to join with negative and 
simplistic currents of opinion that keep on re-
peating, without many grounds for doing so, that 
no progress has been made in this area. On the 
contrary, it would appear appropriate to recog-
nize the projects and experience built up, while 
not forgetting the great potential for regional 
co-operation that is as yet unexplored. 
In the first place, it is necessary to appraise 
this potential for co-operation, as well as the di-
version of trade from outside the region to within 
it, since this would contribute to a more adequate 
use of production capacity. But it is also neces-
sary to augment the trade flows on the basis of 
pragmatic proposals and instruments for region-
al co-operation and linkage in keeping with the 
present conditions and circumstances. In many 
cases, the mistakes made may be attributed to the 
setting of over-ambitious targets whose cost was 
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difficult for the economic and political author-
ities to evaluate, so that this often hindered their 
fulfilment and led, sooner or later, to inevitable 
frustration. Considerable progress has now been 
made in this terrain, however, and the reforms 
and attitudes adopted recently by the integration 
schemes themselves, as well as bilateral policies, 
recognize the need to proceed with a great deal 
of pragmatism. It therefore seems necessary to 
insist on these pragmatic approaches in all possi-
ble ways, both bilateral and multilateral, public as 
well as private. This obviously calls for political 
definitions and a clear preferential attitude on 
the part of the governments in order to give the 
necessary political impetus to the possible modes 
of regional co-operation and complementarity. 
It is likewise essential to continue penetra-
ting the international markets where the appear-
ance of important new competitors and the 
growing protectionism of the centres render in-
dispensable the forging of a clear alliance be-
tween the private sector and the State in our 
countries. It will be difficult to tackle the thorny 
stages of the future unless interests are clearly 
harmonized and complemented, as, moreover, is 
done in all the countries of the world. The open-
ing of markets necessarily involves a growing 
diversification of customers. And in this connec-
tion, without losing sight of the fact that our 
traditional markets will continue to hold the 
greatest potential, a realistic but persistent aim 
should be to give support to co-operation with 
developing countries and regions. This is a diffi-
cult task, as it is extremely hard to enter the 
North-South channels which today predomi-
nate in the trade and co-operation relations of 
the developing world; nevertheless, these aims 
must be incorporated in the foreign policies of 
our countries as both a political and an economic 
option. 
* * * 
It goes without saying that no claim has been 
made in the foregoing reflections to propose or 
build a new model for the region, and even less to 
exhaust the many targets and instruments of the 
new stages of its economic development. All that 
is sought is to call attention to several aspects that 
will require important definitions and to which 
consideration must be given in the devising of the 
new development policies. 
There is a key factor, that has necessarily had 
to be kept out of the appraisal, but which it would 
be naive to overlook, namely the political ele-
ment. There can be no doubt that the mobiliza-
tion of social efforts to construct the new stages of 
the economic development process must be 
framed within explicit political projects. The 
permanent and irrevocable ethical aim of build-
ing open, pluralistic societies with full participa-
tion assumes fundamental importance under the 
present circumstances. Indeed, it seems incon-
ceivable to try to harmonize the many social de-
mands that have been shelved, nor those that will 
necessarily arise, without democratic and parti-
cipative processes making it possible to arrive at 
the new social compacts that will permit the 
a t ta inment of major goals. This awareness 
appears to be spreading throughout the region. 
It will be the responsibility of the political leaders 
and of their parties to make the essential con-
tribution to the creation of a society which, in 
governing its own destiny, will arrive at great 
consensuses that will permit, if not the elimina-
tion of conflicts, at least the reduction of the 
social, economic and political costs they involve. 
